We argue that the tools of decision theory should be taken more seriously in the specification and analysis of systems. We illustrate this by considering a simple problem involving reliable communication, showing how considerations of utility and probability can be used to decide when it is worth sending heartbeat messages and, if they are sent, how often they should be sent.
Introduction
In designing and implementing systems, choices must always be made: When should we garbage collect? Which transactions should be aborted (to remove a deadlock)? How big should the page table be? How often should we resend a message that is not acknowledged? Currently, these decisions seem to be made based on intuition and experience. However, studies suggest that decisions made in this way are prone to inconsistencies and other pitfalls [15] . Just as we would like to formally verify critical programs in order to avoid bugs, we would like to apply formal methods when making important decisions in order to avoid making suboptimal decisions. Mathematical logic has given us the tools to verify programs, among other things. There are also standard mathematical tools for making decisions, which come from decision theory [14] . We believe that these tools need to be taken more seriously in systems design. We view this paper as a first step towards showing how this can be done and the benefits of so doing.
Before we delve into the technical details, let us consider a motivating example. Suppose Alice made an appointment with Bob and the two are supposed to meet at five. Alice shows up at five on the dot but Bob is nowhere in sight. At 5:20, Alice is getting restless. The question is "To stay, or not to stay?" The answer, of course, is "It depends." Clearly, if Bob is an important business client and they are about to close a deal, she might be willing to wait longer. On the other hand, if Bob is an in-law she never liked, she might be happy to have an excuse to leave. At a more abstract level, the utility of actually having the meeting is (or, at least, should be) an important ingredient in Alice's calculations. But there is another important ingredient: likelihood. If Alice and Bob meet frequently, she may know something about how prompt he is. Does he typically arrive more or less on time (in which case the fact that he is twenty minutes late might indicate that he is unlikely to come at all) or is he someone who quite often shows up half an hour late? Not surprisingly, utilities and probabilities (as measures of likelihood) are the two key ingredients in decision theory.
While this example may seem far removed from computer systems, it can actually be viewed as capturing part of atomic commitment [16] . To see this, suppose there is a coordinator p c and two other processes p a and p b working on a transaction. To commit the transaction, the coordinator must get a yes vote from both p a and p b . Suppose the coordinator gets a yes from p a , but hears nothing from p b . Should it continue to wait or should it abort the transaction? The types of information we need to make this decision are precisely those considered in the Alice-Bob example above: probabilities and utilities. While it is obvious that the amount of time Alice should wait depends on the situation, atomic commit protocols typically have a context-independent timeout period. If p c has not heard from all the processes by the end of the timeout period, then the transaction is aborted. Since the importance of the transaction and the cost of waiting are context-dependent, the timeout period would not be appropriate in every case.
Although it is not done in atomic commit protocols, there certainly is an awareness that we need to take utilities or costs into account elsewhere in the database literature. 1 For example, when a deadlock is detected in a database system, some transaction(s) must be rolled back to break the deadlock. How do we decide which ones? The textbook response [16, p. 497] is that " [we] should roll back those transactions that will incur the minimum cost. Unfortunately, the term minimum cost is not a precise one." Typically, costs have been quantified in this context by considering things like how long the transaction has been running and how much longer it is likely to run, how many data items it has used, and how many transactions will be involved in a rollback. This is precisely the type of analysis to which the tools of decision theory can be applied. Ultimately we are interested in when each transaction of interest will complete its task. However, some transactions may be more important than others. Thus, ideally, we would like to attach a utility to each vector of completion times. Of course, we may be uncertain about the exact outcome (e.g., the exact running time of a transaction). This is one place where likelihood enters the picture. Thus, in general, we will need both probabilities and utilities to decide which are the most appropriate transactions to abort. Of course, obtaining the probabilities and utilities may in practice be difficult. Nevertheless, we may often be able to get reasonable estimates of them (see Sect. 6 for further discussion of this issue), and use them to guide our actions.
In this paper, we illustrate how decision theory can be used and some of the subtleties that arise in using it. We focus on one simple problem involving reliable communication. For ease of exposition, we make numerous simplifying assumption in our analysis. Despite these simplifying assumptions, we believe our results show that decision theory can be used in the specification and design of systems.
We are not the first to attempt to apply decision theory in computer science. Shenker and his colleagues [2, 4] , for example, have used ideas from decision theory to analyze various network protocols; Microsoft has a Decision Theory and Adaptive Systems group that has successfully used decision theory in a number of applications, including troubleshooting problems with printers and intelligent user interfaces in Office '97. (See http://research.microsoft.com/dtas/ for further details.) Mikler et al. [13] have looked at network routing from a utility-theoretic perspective. One important difference between our paper and that of Mikler et al. is that they do not treat the utility function as a given. Their aim is to find a good utility function (which is used as a heuristic function for their routing algorithm) so that the routing algorithm exhibits certain desired behavior. More generally, our focus on writing specifications in terms of utility, and the subtleties involved with the particular application we consider herereliable communication-make the thrust of this paper quite different from others in the literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We briefly review some decision-theoretic concepts in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3 we describe the basic model and introduce the communication problem that serves as our running example. We show that the expected cost of even a single attempt at reliable communication is infinite if there is uncertainty about process failures. We then show in Sect. 4 how we can achieve reliable communication with finite expected cost by augmenting our system with heartbeat messages, in the spirit of Aguilera, Chen, and Toueg [1] . However, the heartbeat messages themselves come at a cost; this cost is investigated in Sect. 5. We offer some conclusions in Sect. 6. Some proofs are relegated to the appendix.
A brief decision theory primer
The aim of decision theory is to help an agent make rational decisions. There are a number of equivalent ways of formalizing the decision process. In this paper, we assume that (a) we have a set O of possible states of the world or outcomes, (b) the agent can assign a utility from R ∪ {∞, −∞} (denoted R * ) to each outcome in O, and (c) each action or choice a available to the agent can be associated with a subset O a of O and a probability measure Pr a on O a . (This is essentially equivalent to viewing Pr a as a probability measure on O that assigns probability 0 to the outcomes in O − O a .)
Roughly speaking, the utility associated with an outcome measures how happy the agent would be if that outcome occurred. Thus, utilities quantify the preferences of the agent. The agent prefers outcome o 1 to outcome o 2 iff the utility of o 1 is higher than that of o 2 . The set O a of outcomes associated with an action or choice a are the outcomes that might arise if a is performed or chosen; the probability measure on O a represents how likely each outcome is if a is performed. These are highly nontrivial assumptions, particularly the assumption that we know O a and Pr a for each a. We discuss them (and to what extent they are attainable in practice) in Sect. 6. For now, though, we just focus on their consequences.
Recall that a random variable on the set O of outcomes is a function from O to R * . Given a random variable X and a probability measure Pr on the outcomes, the expected value of X with respect to Pr, denoted E Pr (X), is
where X(O) is the range of X and X = v denotes the set {o ∈ O : X(o) = v}. We drop the superscript Pr if it is clear from the context. Note that utility is just a random variable on outcomes. Thus, with each action or choice a, we have an associated expected utility, where the expectation is taken with respect to O a and Pr a . Since utilities can be infinite, we need some conventions to handle infinities in arithmetic expressions. If x > 0, we let x · ±∞ = ±∞; if x < 0, we let x·±∞ = ∓∞. For all x ∈ R, we let x+±∞ = ±∞. Finally, we let 0 · ∞ = 0. We assume that + and · remain commutative on R * , so this covers all the cases except ∞ + (−∞), which we take to be undefined.
The "rational choice" is typically taken to be the one that maximizes expected utility. While other notions of rationality are clearly possible, for the purposes of this paper, we focus on expected utility maximization. Again, see Sect. 6 for further discussion of this issue.
We can now apply these notions to the Alice-Bob example from the introduction. One way of characterizing the possible outcomes is as pairs (m a , m b ) , where m a is the number of minutes that Alice is prepared to wait, and m b is the time that Alice and Bob may well assign different utilities to these outcomes. Since we are interested in Alice's decision, we consider Alice's utilities. A very simple assumption is that there is a fixed positive benefit meet-Bob to Alice if she actually meets Bob and a cost of c-wait for each minute she waits, and that these utilities are additive. We assume here that c-wait ≤ 0. (In general, costs are described by non-positive utilities.) Under this assumption, the utility of the outcome
Of course, in practice, the utilities might be much more complicated and need not be additive. For example, if Alice has a magazine to read, waiting for the first fifteen minutes might be relatively painless but, after that, she might get increasingly frustrated and the cost of waiting might increase exponentially, not linearly. The benefit to meeting Bob may also depend on the time they meet, independent of Alice's frustration. For example, if they have a dinner reservation for 6 PM at a restaurant half an hour away, the utility of meeting Bob may drop drastically after 5:30. Finally, the utility of Once Alice has decided on a utility function, she has to decide what action to take. The only choice that Alice has is how long to wait. With each choice m a , the set of possible outcomes consists of those of the form (m a , m b ), for all possible choices of m b . Thus, to compute the expected utility of the choice m a , she needs a probability measure over this set of outcomes, which effectively means a probability measure over Bob's possible arrival times.
This approach of deciding at the beginning how long to wait may seem far removed from actual practice, but suppose instead Alice sent her assistant Cindy to meet Bob. Knowing something about Bob's timeliness (or lack thereof), she may well want to give Cindy instructions for how long to wait. Taking the cost of waiting to be linear in the amount of time that Cindy waits is now not so unreasonable, especially if Alice pays Cindy the same amount per hour whether Cindy is waiting for Bob or doing something else. If Cindy goes to meet Bob frequently for Alice, it may make more sense for Alice just to tell Cindy her utility function, and let Cindy decide how long to wait based on the information she acquires regarding Bob's punctuality. Of course, once we think in terms of Alice sending an assistant, it is but a small step to think of Alice running an application, and giving the application instructions to help it decide how to act.
Reliable communication
We now consider a problem that will serve as a running example throughout the rest of the paper. Consider a system consisting of a sender p and a receiver q connected by an unreliable bidirectional link. We assume that the link satisfies the following properties:
• The transmission delay of the link is τ .
• The link can only fail by losing (whole) messages and the probability of a message loss is 0 < γ < 1.
We assume that the transmission delay and the probability of message loss are independent of the state of the system.
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A process is correct if it never crashes. For x ∈ {p, q}, let α x be the probability that x is correct (more precisely, the probability of the set of runs in which x is correct). 3 In runs in which x is not correct, x crashes in each time unit with probability 0 < β x < 1, independent of all other events in the system (such as the events that occurred during the previous time unit).
The assumptions that seems most reasonable to us is that α p = α q = 0: in practice, there is always a positive probability that a process will crash in any given round. We refer to the interval of time between times k − 1 and k as round k, so the duration of a round is a single time unit; we use "round" and "time unit" interchangeably. We allow the possibility that α x = 0 to facilitate comparison to most of the literature, which does not make probabilistic assumptions about failure. It also may be a useful way of modeling the scenario in which processes stay up (i.e., do not crash) forever "for all practical purposes" (for example, if the system is scheduled to be taken off-line before the processes crash).
We want to implement a reliable link on top of the unreliable link provided by the system. That is, we want to implement a reliable send and receive, denoted SEND and RECEIVE, respectively, by a send-receive protocol SR, using the (unreliable) send and receive provided by the link, denoted send and receive, respectively. SR is a joint protocol, consisting of a protocol for the sender (SR sd ) and a protocol for the receiver (SR rc ). SR can be initiated by either p or q. A sendreceive protocol is said to be sender-driven if it is initiated by p and receiver-driven if it is initiated by q. Web browsing can be viewed as an instance of a receiver-driven activity: the web browser queries the web server for the content of the page.
We assume that sends and receives take place at a point in time, while SENDs and RECEIVEs take place over an interval of time (since, in general, they may involve a sequence of sends and receives). We say that SR is invoked with m if m is the message that p should SEND for that particular invocation. Note that m may not be known at the time that SR invoked with m; if SR is receiver-driven, it will be invoked by the receiver, which presumably does not know m at the time of invocation. We said "m is the message that p should SEND" in the definition, since in a run of a receiver-driven protocol, p may not get to actually SEND m if there are process crashes. For ease of exposition, we assume that, if SR is invoked more than once in a run, then each invocation is associated with a different message. (Thus, we are implicitly assuming that messages are time-stamped or associated with 2 In general, these quantities do depend on the state of the link. For example, γ may be a function of the number of messages in transit. We stick to the simpler model for ease of exposition, although in fact all our results hold in the more general model. 3 A run is a complete description of the behavior of the system over time. a sequence number.) This means that we can talk about the invocation of SR with m in a run, which we denote SR(m).
Let x be one of the processes and y be the other. We assume that send and receive satisfy the following two properties:
• If x receives m at time t in run r, then y sends m at time t−τ and m is not lost (since the link cannot create messages or duplicate messages and the transmission delay is known to be τ ).
• If x sends m at time t then with probability 1−γ, y receives m at time t + τ .
What specification should SR satisfy? Clearly we do not want the processes to create messages out of whole cloth. Thus, we certainly want the following safety requirement:
S 0 . For all runs r and messages m, there is at most one RECEIVE and at most one SEND of m in r. Moreover, if there is a RECEIVE of m in r and it finishes at time t, then there is a SEND of m in r, it starts at some time t 1 ≤ t in r, and q receives m at some time t 2 with t 1 ≤ t 2 ≤ t.
Recall that SEND and RECEIVE take place over an interval of time. The intervals certainly might overlap. In fact, it is possible for RECEIVE to finish before SEND finishes, and it is possible for RECEIVE to start before SEND starts. However, S 0 says that RECEIVE cannot finish if (the corresponding) SEND has not started. We shall implicitly assume S 0 without further comment throughout the paper. Note that S 0 does not allow m to be modified. That is, the protocol cannot attach sequence numbers, wrappers, etc., to the message. This is not a problem, given that, in practice, protocols typically come in protocol stacks in which each layer performs one function. We are focusing on a layer that provides reliability without altering the message that goes through it. Other layers may, of course, alter the messages they get (e.g., by adding headers to the messages, by packetizing the messages, by encrypting the messages, etc.). In fact, since we are assuming that each invocation of SR in a particular run is associated with a different message, we are implicitly assuming that the layer(s) above the one we are considering will make the messages unique, which might involve adding a sequence number. S 0 would be considerably more complicated if the message can be altered by the protocol. (Roughly speaking, we would have to set up a correspondence between the high-level messages and the low-level messages, which can get complicated if we want to handle all possible modifications.) The more interesting question is what liveness requirements SR should satisfy. Perhaps the most obvious requirement is the following: Although S 1 is very much in the spirit of typical specifications, which focus only on what happens if processes are correct, we would argue that it is rather uninteresting, for two reasons (which apply equally well to many other similar specifications). The first shows that it is too weak: If α p = α q = 0, then p and q are correct (i.e., never crash) with probability 0. Thus, specification S 1 is rather uninteresting in this case: It is saying something about a set of runs with vanishingly small likelihood. The second problem shows that S 1 is too strong:
In runs where p and q are correct, there is a chance (albeit a small one) that the link may lose all messages. In this case, q cannot finish the RECEIVE of m, since it cannot receive m (as all the messages are lost). Thus S 1 is not satisfied. Of course, both of these problems are well known. The standard way to strengthen S 1 to deal with the first problem is to require only that p and q be correct for "sufficiently long", but then we need to quantify this; it is far from clear how to do so. The standard way to deal with the second problem is to restrict attention to fair runs, according to some notion of fairness [8] , and require only that q finishes the RECEIVE of m in fair runs. Fairness is a useful abstraction for helping us characterize conditions necessary to prove certain properties. However, what makes fairness of practical interest is that, under reasonable probabilistic assumptions, it holds with probability 1.
Our interest here, as should be evident from the introduction, is to make more explicit use of probability in writing a specification. For example, we can write a probabilistic specification like the following: Requirement S 2 avoids the two problems we saw with S 1 . It says, in a precise sense, that if p and q are up for sufficiently long, then q will finish the RECEIVE of m with high probability (where "sufficiently long" is quantified probabilistically). Moreover, by making only a probabilistic statement, we do not have to worry about unfair runs: They occur with probability 0.
The traditional approach has been to separate specifying the properties that a protocol must satisfy from the problem of finding the best algorithm that meets the specification. But that approach typically assumes that properties are all-or-nothing propositions. That is, it implicitly assumes that a desirable property must be true in every run (or perhaps every fair run) of a protocol. It does not allow a designer to specify that it may be acceptable for a desirable property to sometimes fail to hold, if that results in much better properties holding in general. We believe that, in general, issues of cost should not be separated from the problem of specifying the behavior of an algorithm. A protocol that satisfies a particular traditional specification may do so at the price of having rather undesirable behavior on a significant fraction of runs. For example, to ensure safety, a protocol may block 20% of the time. There may be an alternate protocol that is unsafe only 2% of the time but also blocks only 2% of the time. Whether it is better to violate safety 2% of the time and liveness 2% of the time or to never violate safety but violate liveness 20% of the time obviously depends on the context. The problem with the traditional approach is that this comparison is never even considered (any algorithm that does not satisfy safety is automatically dismissed).
While we believe S 2 is a better specification of what is desired than S 1 , it is still not good enough for our purposes, since it does not take costs into account. Without costs, we still cannot decide if it is better to violate liveness 20% of the time or to violate safety 2% of the time and liveness 2% of the time. As a first step to thinking in terms of costs, consider the following specification:
The expected cost of an invocation of SR with respect to the cost function c is finite.
As stated, S 3 is still not completely well specified, since we have not defined "the expected cost of an invocation of SR." In fact, there are a number of ways of defining this, depending on the cost function. We now give the definition in the case of one particularly simple cost function, much in the spirit of the Alice-Bob example discussed in Sect. 2; in Sect. 5, we consider a more complicated cost function. Let SR be a send-receive protocol. We want to compute the expected cost of invoking m in each run where it is invoked. (Note that, in general, different messages will have different expected costs, since the behavior of SR(m) may depend on m; in all the protocols in this paper, the cost is independent of m.) There are two types of costs we will take into account: sending messages and waiting. The intuition is that each attempt to send a message consumes some system resources and each time unit spent waiting costs the user. The total cost is a weighted sum of the two. More precisely, let c-send and c-wait be (non-negative) constants representing the cost of a send and the cost of waiting one time unit, respectively. 4 Given a run r where SR is invoked with m, let #-send m (r) be the number (possibly ∞) of sends done by the protocol on behalf of SR(m) in run r. We now want to define t-wait m (r), which intuitively is the amount of time q spends waiting to finish the RECEIVE of m in run r. When should we start counting? Clearly, when SR(m) is invoked in r. When do we stop counting? If there are no process crashes, then we stop counting when q finishes the RECEIVE of m. (If there are no process crashes and q never finishes the RECEIVE of m, then we never stop counting-that is, t-wait m (r) = ∞ in this case.) What if there are process crashes? In traditional specifications (such as S 1 ), the protocol has no obligations once a process fails. To facilitate comparison between our approach and the traditional approach, we stop counting at the time of a process crash if it happens before q finishes the RECEIVE of m. (Note that q might never finish the RECEIVE of m if a process crashes.)
More precisely, let t s be the time SR(m) starts. Let t p be the time p crashes (t p = ∞ if p does not crash); let t q be the time q crashes (t q = ∞ if q does not crash); let t f be the time q finishes the RECEIVE of m (t f = ∞ if q does not finish). Proof. Suppose α p = α q = 1. Consider a send-receive protocol SR 0 which, when invoked with m, p sends m in every round until it receives ack(m) and q sends ack(m) for the kth time N k rounds after it receives m for the kth time, where N > γ −1 (recall that γ is the probability of message loss). SR 0 starts when p first sends m; q finishes the RECEIVE of m when it receives m for the first time. It is easy to see that SR 0 satisfies S 2 . We show that it does not satisfy S 3 [c 0 ] by showing that E(#-send m ) = ∞ (for all m). The basic idea is that q is not acknowledging the receipt of m in a timely fashion, so p will send too many copies of m. Fix some m. For ease of exposition, we restrict our attention to the set of runs in which SR is invoked with m at time 0 throughout the proof. Let A k = {r : SR(m) starts in r and q's first k ack(m)s are lost and the (k + 1)st ack(m) is not lost in r}; let A ∞ = {r : SR(m) starts in r and all of q's ack(m)s are lost}. Note that Pr(A k ) = γ k (1−γ) and Pr(A ∞ ) = 0 (so we can ignore runs in A ∞ for the purpose of computing expected cost, since we adopted the convention that 0 · ∞ = 0).
It is clear that the last sum is not finite, since Nγ > 1; thus the algorithm fails to satisfy S 3 [c 0 ]. Suppose α p = α q = 0. Consider the trivial protocol (i.e., the "do nothing" protocol). Note that q never finishes the RECEIVE of m in any run (since there are no sends in any run). In a round in which both p and q are up, one of p or q will crash in the next round with probability β = β p + β q − β p β q . So the probability that the first crash happens at time k is (1 − β) k β. Thus one of them is expected to crash at time
(Here and elsewhere in this paper we use the well-known fact that Proof. Suppose α q = 1 or α p = 0. Consider the (senderdriven) protocol SR 1 in which, when invoked with m, p sends m in every round until p receives ack(m) and q sends ack(m) whenever it receives m. SR 1 starts when p first sends m and q finishes the RECEIVE of m the first time it receives m. To see that SR 1 is correct, first consider the case α q = 1. For ease of exposition in this proof, suppose that SR 1 is invoked at time 0 in all runs with message m. We show that E(c m 0 ) is finite. Let C p = {r : p receives ack(m) in r}. Let N 1 (r) = k 1 if q first receives m in run r at time k 1 + τ (which means that the first k 1 copies of m are lost) and let N 2 (r) = k 2 if p first receives ack(m) in run r at time k 2 + 2τ (which means that, for the first k 2 times p sends m, either m is lost or the corresponding ack(m) is lost). Since the probability that the link may drop a particular message is γ,
Moreover, since p stops sending m when it receives ack(m), it will stop 2τ rounds after the N 2 (r)th send of m in run r. Thus,
1
(1−γ) 2 + 2τ − 1 is the number of times p is expected to send m in runs of C p . We expect 1 − γ of these to get through, so the number of times q is expected to send ack(m) is at most
(The actual expected value is slightly less, since q may crash shortly after sending the first ack(m) that got through in runs of
We now turn to E(c m 0 | C p ). We first partition C p into two sets:
• F 1 = {r : p crashes before it receives ack(m)} and • F 2 = {r : p does not crash and never receives ack(m)}.
Note that Pr(F 2 ) = 0 (since α q = 1) and Pr(F 1 ) = 1 − Pr(C p ), so we may ignore runs of F 2 for the purposes of computing the expected cost, since we adopted the convention that 0 · ∞ = 0. For r ∈ F 1 , t-wait m (r) is at most the time it takes for p to crash, which is expected to occur at time
. To see that the protocol satisfies S 2 , note that for t ≥ τ , the probability that q does not finish the RECEIVE of m by time t given that both p and q are still up is γ t−τ . Thus S 2 is also satisfied. Now consider the case that α p = 0. Note that in this case, p is expected to crash at time Now suppose α p = 1 or α q = 0. These cases are somewhat analogous to the ones above, except we need a receiverdriven protocol. Consider a protocol SR 2 in whichueries p in every round until it gets a message from p. More precisely, let reqdenote a request message. Process q sends req every time unit until it receives m, and p sends m every time it receives req. SR 2 starts when q sends reqfor the first time and q finishes the RECEIVE of m when q receives m for the first time. By reasoning similar to the previous cases, we can show that E(#-send m ) and E(t-wait m ) are both finite (so S 3 [c 0 ] is satisfied) and that S 2 is satisfied.
We now turn to the negative result. It turns out that the negative result is much more general than the positive result. In particular, it holds for any cost function with a certain property. In the following, we use g Proof. Suppose SR is a send-receive protocol for p and q. Fix some m. Since in calculating E(c m ) we restrict attention to runs where SR(m) is invoked, without loss of generality, assume that SR(m) is invoked in all runs. For ease of exposition, we further assume that it is in fact invoked at time 0. Let R 1 = {r : q crashes at time 0 and p is correct in r}. Note that p will do the same thing in all runs in R 1 : Either p stops sending m after some time t or p never stops. If p never stops, then #-send m (r) = ∞ for all r ∈ R 1 . Since, by assump-
we are done. Now suppose p stops sending m after some time t. Let R 2 = {r : p crashes at time 0 and q is correct in r}. Note that q will do the same thing in all runs of R 2 : Either q stops sending m after some time t or q never stops. If q never stops, then c m (r) = ∞ for all r ∈ R 2 and Pr(R 2 ) = α q (1 − α p )β p > 0, so again we are done. Finally, suppose that q stops sending m at time t in runs of R 2 . Let t = 1 + max{t, t }. Consider R 3 = {r : both processes are correct and all messages up to time t are lost in r}. Then t-wait m (r) = ∞ for all r ∈ R 3 . By assumption, t-wait m (r) ∞ =⇒ c m (r), so c m (r) = ∞ for all r ∈ R 3 . Let n p and n q be the number of invocations of send by p and q, respectively, in runs of R 3 (note that p and q do the same thing in all runs of R 3 ). Then r be generalizations (in the sense that they send m every δ rounds, where δ need not be 1) of the sender-driven and receiver-driven protocols from the proof of Theorem 3.2, respectively. Let SR tr denote the trivial (i.e., "do nothing") protocol. We use E SR to denote the expectation operator determined by the probability measure on runs induced by using protocol SR. Thus, for example, E 
Proof. The relatively straightforward (but tedious!) calculations are relegated to the appendix.
Note that the expected cost of messages for SR δ s is the same as that for SR δ r , except that the roles of β p and β q are reversed. The expected time cost of SR δ r is roughly τ higher than that of SR δ s , because q cannot finish the RECEIVE before time 2τ with a receiver-driven protocol, whereas q may finish the RECEIVE as early as τ with a sender-driven protocol. This says that the choice between the sender-driven and receiver-driven protocol should be based largely on the relative probability of failure of p and q. It also suggests that we should take δ very large to minimize costs. (Intuitively, the larger δ is, the lower the message costs in the case that q crashes before acknowledging p's message.) This conclusion about δ (which may not seem so reasonable) is essentially due to the fact that we are examining a single invocation of SR in isolation. As we shall see in Sect. 5, this conclusion is no longer justified once we consider repeated invocations of SR. Finally, note that, if the cost of messages is high and waiting is cheap, the processes are better off (according to this cost function) using SR tr .
Thus, as far as S 3 [c 0 ] is concerned, there are times when SR tr is better than SR δ s or SR δ r . How much of a problem is it that SR tr does not satisfy S 2 ? Our claim is that if this desideratum (i.e., S 2 ) is important, then it should be reflected in the cost function. While the cost function in our example does take into account waiting time, it does not penalize it sufficiently to give us S 2 . It is not too hard to find a cost function that does capture 5 Recall that
Proof. Suppose SR is a protocol that does not satisfy S 2 ; we show that it does not satisfy S 3 [c 1 ]. Again, without loss of generality, we can assume that SR(m) is in fact invoked in all runs. Let C p (t) and C q (t) consist of those runs of SR(m) where p and q, respectively, are up for at least t time units after the start of SR(m). Let R q (t) consist of the runs of SR(m) where q finishes the RECEIVE of m no later than t time units after the start of SR(m). Since SR does not satisfy S 2 , there exist ε > 0 and an increasing infinite sequence of times t 0 , t 1 
We consider the case α p = α q = 1 and α p α q < 1 separately.
Suppose that
Given our independence assumptions regarding process failures,
A similar argument (exchanging the roles of C p and C q ) shows that Pr(W (
Since (1−β p −β q +β p β q )N > 1 by assumption, E(c m 1 ) = ∞ and we are done.
The moral here is that S 3 gives us the flexibility to specify what really matters in a protocol, by appropriately describing the cost function. We would like to remind the reader that the cost functions are not ours to choose: They reflect the user's preferences. (Thus we are not saying that c 1 is better than c 0 or vice versa, since each user is entitled to her own preferences.) What we are really saying here is that if S 2 matters to the user, then her cost function c would force S 3 [c] to imply S 2 -in particular, her cost function could not be c 0 .
Using heartbeats
We saw in Lemma 3.3 that
, and we are not certain about the correctness of the processes (i.e., if the probability that they are correct is strictly between 0 and 1). Aguilera, Chen, and Toueg [1] (ACT from now on) suggest an approach that circumvents this problem, by using a heartbeat failure detector, which they denote by HB. Informally, when a system comes with HB, each process i has access to a local module that keeps track of how many heartbeats it has heard from the other process(es). Each process periodically queries its local module to see if new heartbeats have arrived. What each process does may depend on whether or not it (or more precisely, its local module) received new heartbeats. The details of HB are beyond the scope of this paper, and we refer the interested reader to ACT. ACT show that there is a protocol using HB that achieves quiescent reliable communication; i.e., in every run of the protocol, only finitely many messages are required to achieve reliable communication (not counting the heartbeats, since those are failure detector messages, not protocol messages). Moreover, they show that, in a precise sense, quiescent reliable communication is not possible without failure detectors, if we are not certain about the correctness of the processes and the link is unreliable, a result much in the spirit of the negative part of Theorem 3.2. 6 In this section, we show that we can use heartbeats to implement S 3 [c 0 ] for all values of α p and α q .
For the purposes of this paper, assume that processes send a message we call hbmsgto each other every η time units. Protocol SR HB in Fig. 1 is a protocol for reliable communication based on ACT's protocol. (It is not as general as theirs, but it retains all the features relevant to us.) Note that SR HB is a sender-driven protocol, quite like that given in the proof of 6 ACT actually show that their impossibility result holds even if there is only one process failure, only finitely many messages can be lost, and the processes have access to S (a strong failure detector), which means that eventually every faulty process is permanently suspected and at least one correct process is never suspected. Thus, in addition to showing how to implement quiescent reliable communication using HB, ACT show that HB differs from traditional failure detectors, which keep track of a list of suspects (instead of the number of heartbeats received). The "weakest" traditional failure detector needed to solve quiescent reliable communication is ✸P [1] . Again, this topic is beyond the scope of the paper, and we refer the interested reader to ACT for details. The model used by ACT is somewhat different from the one we are considering, but we can easily modify their results to fit our model. This is quite analogous to the ACT results: while it is possible to implement quiescent reliable communication with HB and it is possible to implement HB, it is not possible to have a quiescent implementation of HB. So when ACT say that the their protocol is quiescent, they are not counting the heartbeat messages. 7 The reader might notice that the runs induced by this protocol actually resemble those of the receiver-driven protocol in the proof of Theorem 3.2 (if we identify hbmsgwith req). The difference is that, in the receiver-driven protocol in the proof of Theorem 3.2, the protocol for the receiver actually sends the reqs, whereas here the underlying failure-detection layer sends the hbmsg s.
The analysis of SR HB is much like that of SR δ s in Proposition 3.4. Indeed, in the case that α p = α q = 0, the two protocols are almost identical. The waiting time is roughly τ more for SR HB , since p does not send until it receives the first hbmsg . On the other hand, we are better off using SR HB if q crashes before acknowledging p's message. In this case, with SR δ s , p continues to send m until it crashes, while with SR HB , it stops sending (since it does not get any hbmsg s from q). This leads to an obvious question: Is it really worth sending heartbeats? Of course, if both α p and α q are between 0 and 1, we need heartbeats or something like them to get around the impossibility result of Theorem 3.2. But if α p = α q = 0, then we need to look carefully at the relative size of c-send and c-wait to decide which protocol has the lower expected cost.
This suggests that the decision of whether to implement a heartbeat layer must take probabilities and utilities seriously, even if we do not count either the overhead of building such a layer or the cost of heartbeats. What happens if we take the cost of heartbeats into account? This is the subject of the next section.
The cost of heartbeats
In the previous section, we showed that S 3 [c 0 ] is achievable with the help of heartbeats. When we computed the expected costs, however, we did so with the cost function c 0 , which does not count the cost of heartbeats. While someone who takes the heartbeat layer for granted (such as an application programmer or end-user) may have c 0 as their cost function, someone who has to decide whether to implement a heartbeat layer or how frequently heartbeats should be sent (such as a system designer) is likely to have a different cost functionone which takes the cost of heartbeats into account.
As evidence of this, note that it is immediate from Theorem 4.1 that under the cost function c 0 , the choice of η that minimizes the expected cost is clearly at most 2τ + 1. Intuitively, if we do not charge for heartbeats, there is no incentive to space them out. On the other hand, if we do charge for heartbeats, then typically we will be charging for heartbeats that are sent long after a given invocation of SR HB has completed. The whole point of having a heartbeat layer is that heartbeats are meant to be used, not just by one invocation of a single protocol, but by multiple invocations of (possibly) many protocols. We would expect that the optimal frequency of heartbeats should depend in part on how often the protocols that use them are invoked. The picture we have is that the SR HB protocol is invoked from time to time, by different processes in the system. It may well be that various invocations of it are running simultaneously. All these invocations share the heartbeat messages, so their cost can be spread over all of them. If invocations occur often, then there will be few "wasted" heartbeats between invocations, and the analysis of the previous subsection gives a reasonably accurate reading of the costs involved. On the other hand, if η is small and invocations are infrequent, then there will be many "wasted" heartbeats. We would expect that if there are infrequent invocations, then heartbeats should be spaced further apart.
We now consider a setting that takes this into account. For simplicity, we continue to assume that there are only two processes, p and q, but we now allow both p and q to be the sender. (It is possible to do this with n processes and more than one protocol, but the two-process and single protocol case suffices to illustrate the main point, which is that the optimal η should depend on how often the protocol is invoked.) We assume that each process, while it is running, invokes SR HB with probability σ at each time unit. Thus, informally, at every round, each running process tosses a coin with probability of σ of landing heads. If it lands heads, the process then invokes SR HB with the other as the recipient. Roughly speaking, in computing the cost of a run, we consider the cost of each invocation of SR HB together with the cost of all the heartbeat messages sent in the run. Our interest will then be in the cost per invocation of SR HB . Thus, we apportion the cost of the heartbeat messages among the invocations of SR HB . If there are relatively few invocations of SR HB , then there will be many "wasted" heartbeat messages, whose cost will need to be shared among them.
We say SR HB (m) starts at time t 1 in r if at time t 1 some process x first executes line 1 of the code of the sender with message m. SR HB (m) completes at time t 2 if the last send associated with SR HB (m) (either of a copy of m or a copy of ack(m)) happens at time t 2 . If no sends are asociated with SR HB (m), then we take t 2 = t 1 (that is, the invocation completes as soon as it starts in this case). Note this can happen only if x does not receive new heartbeats after it invokes SR HB . The processes will (eventually) stop sending m or ack(m) if either process crashes or if the sender receives ack(m). Thus, with probability 1, all invocations of SR HB will eventually complete. Let #-SR(r, t) be the number of invocations of SR HB that have completed by time t in r; let c-SR(r, t) be the sum of the costs of these invocations. Let c-hbmsg (r, t) be the (cumulative) cost of sending hbmsg s up to time t in r. We take this to be simply the number of hbmsg s sent up to time t (which we denote by #-hbmsg (r, t)) multiplied by c-send. Let c total (r, t) = c-SR(r, t) + c-hbmsg (r, t). Finally, let
where "lim sup" denotes the limit of the supremum, that is,
Thus c avg (r) is essentially the average cost per invocation of SR HB , taking heartbeats into account. Note that, unlike c 0 , c avg does not depend on m, thus S 3 [c avg ] simply says that we want the expected value of c avg to be finite. We write "lim sup" instead of "lim" since the limit may not exist in general. (However, the proof of the next theorem shows that, in fact, with probability 1, the limit does exist.) For the following result only, we assume that β p and β q are also O(ε). 8 By adding 1 to the denominator, we guarantee it is never 0; adding 1 also simplifies one of the technical calculations needed in the proof of Theorem 5.1.
where λ is a constant (strictly) between 0 and 1.
Proof. Roughly speaking, the first summand corresponds to the expected per-invocation cost of SR HB and the second summand corresponds to the expected per-invocation cost of the heartbeats. See the appendix for the details.
Note that with c avg , we have a real decision to make in terms of how frequently to send heartbeats. As before, there is some benefit to making η > 2τ : it minimizes the number of redundant messages sent when SR HB starts (that is, messages sent by the sender before receiving the receiver's acknowledgment). Also, by making η larger we will send fewer heartbeat messages between invocations of SR HB . On the other hand, if we make η too large, then the sender may have to wait a long time after invoking SR HB before it can send a message to the receiver (since messages are only sent upon receipt of a heartbeat). Intuitively, the greater c-wait is relative to c-send, the smaller we should make η. Clearly we can find an optimal choice for η by standard calculus.
In the model just presented, if c-wait is large enough relative to c-send, we will take η to be 1. Taking η this small is clearly inappropriate once we consider a more refined model, where there are buffers that may overflow. In this case, both the probability of message loss and the time for message delivery will depend on the number of messages in transit. The basic notions of utility still apply, of course, although the calculations become more complicated. This just emphasizes the obvious point is that, in deciding what value (or values) η should have, we need to carefully look at the actual system and the cost function.
Discussion
We have tried to argue here for the use of decision theory both in the specification and the design of systems. Our (admittedly rather simple) analysis already shows both how decision theory can help guide the decision made and how much the decision depends on the cost function. None of our results are deep; the cost function just makes precise what could already have been seen from an intuitive calculation. But this is precisely the point: By writing our specification in terms of costs, we can make the intuitive calculations precise. Moreover, the specification forces us to make clear exactly what the cost function is and encourages the elicitation of utilities from users. We believe that these are both important features. It is important for the user (and system designer) to spend time thinking about what the important attributes of the system are and to decide on preferences between various tradeoffs.
A possible future direction is to study standard problems in the literature (e.g., Consensus, Byzantine Agreement, Atomic Broadcast, etc.) and recast the specifications in utilitytheoretic terms. One way to do this is to replace a liveness requirement by an unbounded increasing cost function (which is essentially the "cost of waiting") and replace a safety requirement by a large penalty. Once we do this, we can analyze the algorithms that have been used to solve these problems, and see to what extent they are optimal given reasonable assumptions about probabilities and utilities.
While we believe that there is a great deal of benefit to be gained from analyzing systems in terms of utility, it is quite often a nontrivial matter. Among the most significant difficulties are the following:
1. Where are the utilities coming from? It is far from clear that a user can or is willing to assign a real-valued utility to all possible outcomes in practice. There may be computational issues (for example, the set of outcomes can be enormous) as well as psychological issues. While the agent may be prepared to assign qualitative utilities like "good", "fair", or "bad", he may not be prepared to assign 20.7. While to some extent the system can convert qualitative utilities to a numerical representation, this conversion may not precisely captures the user's intent. There are also nontrivial user-interface issues involved in eliciting utilities from users. In light of this, we need to be very careful if results depend in sensitive ways on the details of the utilities. 2. Where are the probabilities coming from? We do not expect users to be experts at probability. Rather, we expect the system to be gathering statistics and using them to estimate the probabilities. Of course, someone still has to tell the system what statistics to gather. Moreover, our statistics may be so sparse that we cannot easily obtain a reliable estimate of the probability. 3. Why is it even appropriate to maximize expected utility?
There are times when it is far from clear that this is the best thing to do, especially if our estimates of the probability and utility are suspect. For example, suppose one action has a guaranteed utility of 100 (on some appropriate scale), while another has an expected utility of 101, but has a nontrivial probability of having utility 0. If the probabilities and utilities that were used to calculate the expectation are reliable, and we anticipate performing these actions frequently, then there is a good case to be made for taking the action with the higher expected utility. On the other hand, if the underlying numbers are suspect, then the action with the guaranteed utility might well be preferable.
We see these difficulties not as ones that should prevent us from using decision theory, but rather as directions for further research. It may be possible in many cases to learn a user's utility. Moreover, we expect that in many applications, except for a small region of doubt, the choice of which decision to make will be quite robust, in that perturbations to the probability and utility will not change the decision. Even in cases where perturbations do change the decision, both decisions will have roughly equal expected utility. Thus, as long as we can get somewhat reasonable estimates of the probability and utility, decision theory may have something to offer.
Another important direction for research is to consider qualitative decision theory, where both utility and likelihood are more qualitative, and not necessarily real numbers. This is, in fact, an active area of current research, as http://www.medg. lcs.mit.edu/qdt/bib/unsorted.bib (a bibliography of over 290 papers) attests. Note that once we use more qualitative notions, then we may not be able to compute expected utilities at all (since utilities may not be numeric) let alone take the action with maximum expected utility, so we will have to consider other decision rules.
Finally, we might consider what would be an appropriate language to specify and reason about utilities, both for the user and the system designer.
While it is clear that there is still a great deal of work to be done in order to use decision-theoretic techniques in systems design and specification, we hope that this discussion has convinced the reader of the utility of the approach.
Appendix: Proofs
We present the proofs of Proposition 3.4 and Theorem 5.1. We repeat the statements of the results for the convenience of the reader. Recall that, for Proposition 3.4, we are assuming that β p and β q are both Θ(ε) and that, for Theorem 5.1, we are assuming that β p and β q are both O(ε). 
Proof. Fix m. For SR tr , note that #-send m (r) = 0 for all r, so E SRtr (#-send m ) = 0. We also have that t-wait m (r) is the time of the first crash in r. Since the probability of a crash during a time unit is β = β p + β q − β p β q , we have that the expected time of the first crash, and hence E SRtr (t-wait m ), is
We break the sum into three pieces,
• S 2 = τ Pr(t-wait m = τ ), and
and analyze each one separately. Note that Pr(t-wait 
Thus, we can also ignore S 3 . This gives us E
Let us say that a send of a message got through iff the link does not drop the message. in the first time you talk about a message. I cut it altogether. Note that just because a send got through does not mean the intended recipient will receive the messages: the recipient might crash before the message arrives. Consider the set of runs A = {r : q sends an ack(m) that gets through before q crashes in r}. Roughly speaking, what happens is that, in runs of A, with probability ≈ 1, p receives ack(m) at time 2τ . In the meantime, probability ≈ 1, p sends m exactly . In A, the expected value of #-send m is very large, since p will send m every round until it crashes, so despite the low probability of A, it contributes the term (τ +1)βq δβp . We now turn to the details. We first compute Pr(A). Note that q can send ack(m) only at times of the form τ + kδ. Let B k = {r : q sends the first ack(m) that gets through at time τ + kδ}. Note
Since q sends the first ack(m) that gets through at time τ + kδ in runs of B k , p must send m (that gets through) at time kδ in runs of B k . Thus
The first factor reflects the fact that p must have been up at time kδ (to send m) while the second factor reflects the fact that q must have been up at time τ + kδ (to receive m and send ack(m)). The third factor reflects the fact that the previous k attempts have failed: either m was lost or the corresponding ack(m) was lost, which occurs with probability γ + (1 − γ)γ = 2γ − γ 2 . The final factor reflects the fact that the (k + 1)st attempt succeeded: both messages got through. So
We now want to compute E 
, and
and compute each part separately. Note that
since if p is up at time 2τ , q is up at time δ ; so S 1 ≈ 0. We now turn our attention to S 3 .
Note that p sends at least half the messages in every run r (whether r ∈ A or r ∈ A). Note also that, after the first successful attempt (that is, after the first time p sends m, it is received by q, and the corresponding acknowledgment gets through), p will send at most 
So we may ignore S 3 as well. Thus E
for r ∈ A, q fails to send an ack(m) that gets through in r. Consider the following three sets (which is a partition of the set of all runs):
• C 1 = {r : p crashes at time 0 in r}, • C 2 = {r : p does not crash at time 0 and q crashes at or before time τ in r}, and • C 3 = {r : p does not crash at time 0 and q does not crash at or before time τ in r}.
We now show that
First, note that Pr(C 1 ) = β p and Pr(
. Since, as we showed earlier,
. Note that for r ∈ A, p will send messages until it crashes. For r ∈ C 1 , p crashes immediately, so #-send m (r) = 0 for r ∈ C 1 . For r ∈ C 2 , q crashes before it can possibly send any messages, so all the sends are done by p. Thus
since p must be up at time (k − 1)δ and crash before time kδ to send m exactly k times. So
The O(1) term is there because
, which is O(1), since we assumed that β p is Θ(ε) for this proposition.
For r ∈ C 3 ∩ A, q might send messages, but none of them will get through. Let E k = {r ∈ C 3 ∩ A : p crashes at time k}. We have
times in E k and q sends at most that many messages. So we have
Since we assumed that β p is Θ(ε), 
This gives us E
Proof. Roughly speaking, the first summand corresponds to the expected per-invocation cost of SR HB and the second corresponds to the expected per-invocation cost of the heartbeats. To do the analysis carefully, we divide the set of runs into three subsets:
one process is correct and the other eventually crashes in r}, F 2 = {r : both processes are correct in r}, and F 3 = {r : both processes eventually crash in r}.
It is clear that
For r ∈ F 1 , we expect the lone correct process to invoke SR HB infinitely often. All but finitely many of these invocations will take place after the other process crashed. Thus the average cost of an invocation in r will be 0. For r ∈ F 2 , on the other hand, both processes are expected to invoke SR HB infinitely often and the average cost of the invocation in r is expected to be close to the expected cost of a single invocation of SR HB . The computation of the expected cost of an invocation in a run in F 3 is more delicate. We now examine the details.
Let G 1 be the subset of F 1 consisting of runs r in which the correct process tries to invoke the protocol infinitely often. Clearly Pr(G 1 | F 1 ) = 1, since the protocol is invoked with probability σ at each time unit. Moreover, for each run r ∈ G 1 , we have (Note that we have τ + η−1 2 instead of 2τ as in Theorem 4.1. This is because in the current setting, the expected amount of time elapsed between the start of an invocation and the arrival of the first hbmsgis η−1 2 . In the setting of Theorem 4.1, however, the first hbmsgcannot arrive until time τ , since the invocation starts at time 0 and the first send of a hbmsgoccurs at time 0. Note that in both cases, the expected time of waiting is τ plus the expected time elapsed between the start of the invocation and the arrival of the next hbmsg .) Thus Pr(c avg (r) ≈ Z | F 2 ) = 1.
We now turn our attention to F 3 . Let F 3 (t 1 , t 2 , i 1 , i 2 , i 3 ) be a subset of F 3 with the following properties:
• the first crash in r happens at time t 1 , • the second crash in r happens at time t 2 , • the number of invocations starting before time t 1 − 3τ − η is i 1 , • the number of invocations starting between times t 1 −3τ − η and t 1 + τ is i 2 , and • the number of invocations starting after time t 1 + τ is i 3 .
It is clear that each of these sets is measurable. (Some of them are empty, so they will have probability 0; we could introduce restrictions to rule out the empty ones, but leaving them in is not a problem.) Suppose F 3 (t 1 , t 2 , i 1 , i 2 , i 3 ) and the time of waiting is between τ and τ + η − 1, depending on when the first hbmsg arrives after the invocation starts. If no messages are lost, a hbmsgis received every η time units, so the wait for a hbmsgis η−1 2 on average. Thus the first group of invocations contribute i 1 Z to c-SR(r), on average. As for the second group, they contribute something less than i 2 Z to c-SR(r) on average; in many of these invocation, the first process crash (which happens at most 3τ + η after the beginning of an invocation in the second group) may reduce the time of waiting or the number of sends. That is why we have a multiplicative constant κ(t 1 , t 2 , i 1 , i 2 , i 3 ) in front of i 2 . The last group of invocations all have zero cost, since by the time they started, the surviving process (which must be the invoker) will never receive any new hbmsg s from the crashed process; so the time of waiting and the number of sends are both zero.
Thus we have Clearly 0 < λ < 1 and E(c avg | F 3 ) ≈ λZ, as desired. Now we turn to the expected heartbeat costs per invocation. Each process will send a hbmsgevery η time units for as long as it is up. So if in r a process is up at time t, then it sends t η hbmsg s in r up to time t. Suppose r ∈ F 2 . Then, #-hbmsg (r, t) = 2 Next, suppose r ∈ F 1 . Then one of the processes will send only finitely many hbmsg s and invoke SR HB finitely often. Thus after the crash, we have #-hbmsg (r, t) #-SR(r, t) + 1 = Finally, consider the set F 3 , where both processes crash. Again, the situation here is more complicated, since there are only finitely many complete invocations and hbmsg s in each run, so we cannot resort to the Law of Large Numbers. Let 
Thus,
Note that
for some constant L 1 (roughly 1 ησ ). Thus the second summand above is bounded above by
which is O(ε 2 ). Thus we can ignore the second summand.
, we get that
It clearly suffices to show that the second summand above is O(ε). Note that 
